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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 18, 2008, PIaintiffJAppellant, Ray Harrison ("Mr. Harrison") filed his
Opening Brief on Appeal against the DefendantsIAppellees, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, Inc. ("SARMC") and D. Lee Binnion, M.D. ("Dr. Binnion"), arguing that the district
court erred in denying Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend the complaint to assert a claim
against SARMC for negligence in the credentialing and privileging of Dr. Jeffrey Hartford ("Dr.
Hartford"), that the district court erred in granting the Motion for Protective Order regarding the
discovery of the exhibits to the Idaho Board of Medicine's disciplinary hearing regarding Dr.
Hartford's medical license and prohibiting Mr. Harrison from obtaining those exhibits to the
extent they included information regarding Dr. Hartford's substance abuse treatment; and that
the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. On August 13, 2008,
SARMC and Dr. Binnion filed Respondents' Briefs asserting that the district court properly
determined that Idaho Code

5

39-1392c provides immunity from any liabifity for claims of

negligence in the credentialing and privileging of physicians, that the Court should decline to
hear the issue regarding the Board of Medicine exhibits, and that the district court properly
granted summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. Mr. Harrison now submits this Reply Brief on
Appeal and respectllly requests that the Court reverse the district court's decisions finding
immunity for claims of negligent credentialing, prohibiting Mr. Harrison from obtaining the
exhibits used in the Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding, and granting summary judgment
to Dr. Binnion.
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11. ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Harrison's Motion for Leave
to File First Amended Complaint to Assert a Cause of Action for
Negligence in the Credentialing and Privileging of Dr. art ford'
1.

Idaho Code 6 39-1392c does not urovide immunitv fLom neglinent
credentialin2 claims.

In response to Mr. Harrison's opening brief, SARMC asserts that the question to
be resolved on appeal is what is intended by the word "use" in Idaho Code $ 39-1392c. Mr.
Harrison certainly agrees that this is the ultimate question before the Court, hut disagrees with
SARMC's conclusion regarding the legislature's intent for the immunity provisions of that
statute.

SARMC asserts, in agreement with the District Court below, that the statute

unambiguously abrogates any cause of action for negligence in the credentialing and privileging
of a physician because the statute provides civil immunity for the "use" of peer review
information. SARMC concludes that if a hospital uses peer review information in making a
decision regarding the credentialing and privileging of a physician, then Idaho Code $ 39-1392c
provides full immunity for that decision.
The first problem with SARMC's argument is that it focuses on the word "use" to
the exclusion of the rest ofthe statute. In interpreting a statute, the Court's primary function is to

'

In its Statement of Facts, SARMC includes a reference to a suit brought by the Harrisons against Dr. W o r d ' s
insurance company wherein the Harrisons argued that Dr. Hartford was not drinking at the time he treated Mr.
Harrison and also states that there is no evidence of a history of substandard care by Dr. Hartford due to his alcohol
abuse. First, the issue of whether Dr. Hartford was drinking at the time he treated Mr. Harrison is irrelevant to the
question of whether Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provides absolute immunity for claims of negligence in the
credentialiig and privileging of physicians. Mr. Harrison's claim is based on whether or not SARMC was negligent
when the credentialiig occurred in 2001 and the recredentialing was granted in 2003 based on his history of alcohol
and substance abuse. Secondly, to argue that because Dr. Hartford had not caused harm prior to the treatment of
Ray Harrison there was no basis for denying his credentials is to argue that a person arrested for DUI on multiple
occasions should not lose their license to drive until they actually cause serious harm to another person.

-
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determine and give effect to legislative intent. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d
514, 5 16 (2004). Such intent should be derived from reading the whole act. George W. Watkins

Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537,539-40,797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990) (emphasis added),
In this case, the literal words of the statute, as well as the intent derived from the whole Act,
simply do not support an interpretation that abrogates an entire cause of action for negligent
credentialing. Mr. Harrison is not seeking to hold SARMC liable for furnishing, receiving, or
using any particular information in their credentialing process. Rather, Mr. Harrison is seeking

to hold SARMC liable for negligence for its decision to grant hospital privileges to Dr. Hartford.

SARMC asserts that to exclude decision making from the word "use" in the
statute would create a result whereby SARMC would be exempted from liability for receiving
and reviewing information but not from basing a decision on that information. Mr. Harrison
respectfully asserts that this is exactly what the legislature intended. The Idaho Peer Review Act
was first enacted in 1973 and included the grants of immunity for the furnishing of information
or provision of opinions as well as the receiving and use of such information and opinions that
currently exist in Idaho Code $39-1392c. The Statement of Purpose which accompanied House
Bill 136 stated, in part, "[The bill] would also encourage the free exchange of information in
such proceedings by granting civil immunity to persons providing information or opinions to
such review and study committees." Statement of Purpose for 1-1.8. 136 (1973). The purpose of
the bill was to protect medical committees during their discussions and critiques of treatment
decisions and patient care in the hospital. The legislature wanted these committees to be able to
freely discuss what might have gone wrong, what: could be improved, and how to prevent

-

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 3

mistakes or other problems without fear that such discussions could be used in a later lawsuit or
submit the medical committee members to charges of slander or defamation for criticizing their
fellow physicians. That is the context in which the immunity provisions were developed and for
which they were intended.
Had the Legislature intended the word "use" to include all decisions made upon
review and receipt of peer review information and opinions, then it would have, effectively,
eliminated many, if not all, medical malpractice claims in the state.

A doctor facing a

malpractice claim could state that his treatment decision was made "using" information obtained
during the course of a peer review committee proceeding and receive full immunity from the
claim. This is clearly not what the Legislature intended in 1973 and there is nothing to suggest it
was what was intended when the Legislature amended the Idaho Peer Review Act in 2003 to
include credentialing and privileging activities as "peer review activities."
Additionally, the broad interpretation of the word "use" urged by SARMC and
adopted by the District Court is in direct conflict with other provisions of the Idaho Peer Review
Act. Specifically, Idaho Code 5 39-1392e(f) provides that if a physician "makes claim or brings
suit" on account of any investigation or "act" by the health care organization, the physician is
deemed to have waived any claim for privilege of such peer review activities and the health care
organization can release such information and use it in its own defense. Clearly then, the
Legislature contemplated that a health care organization might face suit from a physician for
decisions made in the course of peer review activities, including privileging and credentialing
decisions and provided such health care organizations with a means of protecting themselves
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from such litigation by allowing the release of otherwise protected information if needed for that
defense. In fact, this provision provides that the waiver exists "whether such claim be for
equitable or legal relief or for intentional or unintentional tort of any kind and whether pressed
by

w,physician, emergency medical services personnel, or any other person . . . ." See id

If the Legislature had intended that the word "use" in Idaho Code $ 39-1392c were to include
decisions made in the course of privileging and credentialing proceedings, then the limited
waiver of privilege for suits brought by physicians or patients found in Idaho Code 3 39-1392e(f)
would be superfluous and meaningless. No person would have any cause of action arising from
such decisions and the limited waiver would be unnecessary.
In fact, SARMC cites to the case of Miller v. Saint Alphonsus, 139 Idaho 825, 87
P.3d 934 (2004), in support of its position that the Court has already limited the scope ofjudicial
review for a hospital's decision to deny staff privileges. Thus, the Court has recognized that a
physician has a right to sue the hospital regarding its privileging and credentialing decisions.
Yet, the very existence of such a cause of action is completely inconsistent with the
interpretation of the immunity provisions of Idaho Code

9 39-1392c urged by SARMC in this

case. Further, a review of Miller reveals that the Court did not decline to address the substance
of SARMC's decision because of any judicial deference for privileging and credentialing
decisions but because Idaho is an at-will employment state and nothing in SARMC's bylaws or
the Idaho Code purported to give a physician a contract claim based upon SARMC's alleged
failure to follow its own bylaws in making credentialing and privileging determinations. See id.
at 833, 87 P.3d at 942. Rather, the only basis upon which the Court had to review the decision

-
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was whether SARMC was in compliance with Idaho Code § 39-1395 and IDAPA
16.03.14.200.01.d which requires that the hospital adopt procedures for considering applications
for privileges and that such applicants be provided due process. Thus, the Court concluded that
the only basis for reviewing the decision was to determine if the hospital had adopted such
procedures and had substantially complied with those procedures. See id. at 834-835,87 P.3d at
943-944. Thus, the Court's decision in Miller is consistent with the existence of a cause of
action based upon decisions made regarding the privileging and credentialing of physicians and
any deference to SARMC's decision by the Court was due solely to the fact that the only basis
for review was to ensure compliance with Idaho Code 9 39-1395.

2.

A complele abrogation for any cause o f action for negliaence in
the credentialinn and urivileaina o f physicians is not su~uortedby
the act& lanmaze of the statute.

In addition to being inconsistent with other provisions of the Idaho Peer Review
Act, the interpretation of Idaho Code § 39-1392c adopted by the District Court and urged by
SARMC is unsupported by the literal words and very definitions within the Act when the statute
is read as a whole. Idaho Code

9

39-1392c protects health care organizations, including

hospitals, from "use" of "such information." The Act repeatedly refers to protected peer review
information and defies such information as "all peer review" records which, in turn,is defined
as "all evidence of interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative
graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating to peer
review of any health care organization." See LC.

$3 39-1392b and 39-1392a(12). Thus, at best,

the Act only protects a hospital from being sued for using "interviews, reports, statements,

-
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minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and
all physical materials relating to peer review." In this case, Mr. Harrison's suit is based upon
information publicly available from the Idaho State Board of Medicine and, therefore, cannot be
protected peer review information. As such, Mr. Harrison cannot be seeking to hold SARMC
liable for using protected peer review information. If anything, Mr. Harrison is seeking to hold
SARMC liable for not using publicly available information.
SARMC asserts that as long as a hospital has credential procedures and conducts
a peer review procedure, then it has done all that is required under law. Thus, SARMC admits
that a hospital could credential a physician who does not have a license in the State of Idaho as
long as the applicant submitted the application and it was reviewed by the credentialing
committee. Such action would then immunize a hospital from any claim by the patient if the
physician later committed malpractice, despite the fact that the physician would never have been
in the position to commit such harm had the hospital not been negligent. Such injustice is
particularly clear when the physician is assigned by SARMC in an emergency room situation or
as the on-call physician in a particular circumstance. In such a case, the patient is relying on
SARMC to have made certain that the physician was capable and qualified to practice medicine
and has no opportunity to do any such research himself. Yet, despite the absolute reliance and
clear risk of harm if SARMC has acted negligently, SARMC has no fear of any such liability.
Rather, any hospital could decide that the financial gain from additional physicians was worth
any such risk to the patient.

-
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Such a result is in direct contradiction to the express purposes of the Idaho Peer
Review Act, is unsupported by the plain language of the Act, and would only serve to harm the
public. SARMC cites to the Colorado case of Kauntz v. HCA-Healthone LLC, 174 P.3d 813
(Col. App. 2007), as support for its position that eliminating all negligent credentialing claims
actually supports public policy. In Kauntz, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the Colorado
statute did provide immunity from civil damages for claims brought by patients for negligent
credentialing in some, but not all, circumstances. However, upon review of the Kauntz case, it
actually supports Mr. Harrison's position in this matter.
First, Kauntz demonstrates that Colorado's peer review statute expressly provides
for immunity for decisions by the professional review body.

Secondly, Kauntz expressly

recognized that not all negligent credentialing claims were barred. In fact, Kauntz held that the
immunity provided by the statute was available only if the professional review action was taken
"in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of health care, after reasonable efforts
to obtain the facts of the matter, [after adequate notice to the physician], and in the reasonable
belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain
facts . . . ." See id. at 819. Thus, the Kauntz court concluded that not all negligent credentialing
claims were abrogated and that if peer review action was not taken in accordance with those
standards, a claim would still lie. See id. The fact that a cause of action would still exist under
those circumstances allowed the Colorado court to determine that the statute did not lead to
unjust or absurd results. See id. Thus, Kauntz recognizes that hospitals are not free to credential
and privilege physicians with no regard for the reasonableness of such decisions.
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In this case, Mr. Harrison has relied upon publicly available documents
demonstrating Dr. Hartford's long history with drug and alcohol abuse and has asserted that
SARMC either did not take reasonable efforts to investigate Dr. Hartford's history or that it
could not have acted in reasonable belief that credentialing Dr. Hartford was appropriate after
reviewing his history. As such, even under Colorado's statute, SARMC is not immune from a
claim for negligence in the credentialing and privileging of a physician.

3.

The complete abroaation o f anv cause o f action for nealiaence in
the credentialing and urivileaina of uhvsicians is in direct
contradiction with the ouruoses behind ihe Idaho Peer Review Act
and with other urovisions ofthe Act.

Finally, SARMC asserts that the issue in this case is not the existence of duty, but
the existence of immunity and that it must be decided under the unique provisions of the Idaho
Peer Review Act. Harrison does not disagree with this basic proposition, but affirmatively
asserts that the question of immunity can only be decided by reviewing the act as a whole and in
light of the general rule that the Court's primary function is to determine and give effect to
legislative inteat. Where, as here, the interpretation urged by SARMC and adopted by the
district court does not serve the purposes of the Idaho Peer Review Act, the interpretation cannot
stand. The clear statement of policy from the Legislature regarding the enactment of the Idaho
Peer Review Act was to reduce the morbidity and mortality rates and enforce and im~rove
standards of medical practice in the State of Idaho. See I.C.

-
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5 39-1392.

In order to encourage

those purposes, the Legislature mandated that certain records of peer review committees remain
confidential and privileged in order to allow the free exchange of ideas and opinions within and
between health care organizations. Thus, peer review committees (including credentialing
committees) are free to discuss particular decisions and actions taken by physicians, create
studies and statistics to track events, and otherwise have free and open discussions in order to
frankly and honestly assess the standards of health care in the facility without fear that such
documents or discussions will later be used as evidence in a lawsuit against a physician or a
hospital. That is the policy protected by the Idaho Peer Review Act.
Nothing about the policy of improving the standards of medical care is Whered
by providing absolute immunity for negligent credentialing claims. In fact, such immunity
would only provide incentive to a hospital to be less than diligent in its credentialing activities.
The express provisions of the Idaho Peer Review act regarding the privileged nature of
discussions and documents occurring within peer review proceedings amply protect such
information and promote the purposes of encouraging iiank and honest discussions within those
proceedings. These discussions, in turn, should provide a hospital with the best information
upon which to base their credentialing decision.

In addition, the immunity is directly contradictory with other language within the
statute as was discussed earlier. The Court cannot presume the Legislature intended to abrogate

an entire cause of action when such a result would render another portion of the statute
completely meaningless. Why would the Legislature grant a limited waiver of the privilege to
allow a hospital to defend against a claim that it has intentionally and expressly abrogated? Such
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a result is absurd and, therefore, cannot be upheld by this Court. This further demonstrates that
had the legislature intended to fully abrogate any cause of action for negligence in the
credentialing and privileging of physicians, it would have expressly included such a provision.
Therefore, when the question of immunity is decided in light of the specific language used in
Idaho's Peer Review Act, it is evidence that SARMC is not entitled to absolute immunity for
negligent credentialing claims and that the District Court's decision must be reversed and the
case remanded for furlher proceedings in this matter.3

B.

The District Court Erred in Granting the Motion for Protective Order
Related to the Subpoenafor the Exhibits to the Disciplinary Proceeding
Before the Idaho Board of Medicine.

SARMC has requested that the Court not address Mr. Harrison's claim that the
District Court erred in granting a protective order prohibiting the discovery of the exhibits
admitted to the disciplinary proceeding against Dr. Hartford before the Board of Medicine.
While Mr. Harrison acknowledges that the specific dispute in the District Court was between Dr.
Hartford and Mr. Harrison, the information requested is directly relevant to Mr. Harrison's
claims against SARMC relating to the credentialing and privileging of Dr. Hartford. The District
Court decided the issue as a matter of law and Mr. Harrison respectfully submits that there is no
reason why this Court cannot address this issue at this time. As such, and for the reasons set

SARMC argued in its brief that the Court should not consider Mr. Hamson's argument that the statute is
ambiguous as to the extent of immunity provided because that argument was not raised below and counsel asserted
at the bearing on the motion that the statute unambiguously did not grant complete immunity. Mr. Harrison
respectfully asserts that the arguments raised witbin Mr. Hamson's brief regarding the interpretation of the statute,
including the citation to the legislative history ofthe statute was submitted below. See Tr., pp. 62 - 73.

-
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forth within Mr. Harrison's opening brief, Mr. Harrison respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the District Court's order denying discovery of those materials.

C.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary .Judgment to Dr.
Binnion on the Issue of Causation.

1.

Expert testimonv is not required to establish causation.

Dr. Binnion first argues that expert medical testimony is required to establish
causation in this case. As was discussed in detail in Mr. Harrison's opening brief and will be
discussed fkther below, Mr. Harrison has provided expert medical testimony on causation.
However, under the facts of this case and existing Idaho case law, Mr. Harrison is not required to
produce such expert testimony.
In support of her argument, Dr. Binnion cites to Swallow v. Emergency Medicine

ofldaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003), which expressly stated that whether expert
testimony was required to demonstrate causation was dependent on the particular facts of the
case. In Swallow, the Court held that the jury could not reasonably infer that the patient's heart
attack was caused by an improperly prescribed dose of an antibiotic because there was no expert
testimony establishing that a large dose of the antibiotic could cause a heart attack. See id. at
598, 67 P.3d at 77. Certainly, the question of whether an overdose of a drug causes a specific
physical response is a question of medical knowledge beyond the understanding of the ordinary
juror.
However, that is not the case with which the Court is faced at this time. In this
case, there is undisputed medical testimony from Mr. Harrison's expert, Dr. Laureno, that the
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sole cause of Mr. Harrison's CPM was the rapid rise in Mr. Iiarrison's serum sodium levels. See
R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30 (Affidavit of Erica S. Phillips in Opposition to Defendant D. Lee
Binnion, M.D.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment), Exhibit A (Deposition of Robert
Laureno, M.D.), p. 46, line 6 - p. 49, line 4, and Paragraph 1 of Exhibit 3 to the deposition. In
fact, Dr. Laureno testified that there was no other cause of the CPM than the rapid elevation of
the sodium level in Mr. Harrison's case. See id at p. 50, LL 9-18. That is the medical causation
for his condition. The question of causation as it relates to Dr. Binnion is whether her actions
were a substantial factor in causing that rapid rise in serum sodium which resulted in the CPM.
Thus, this case is substantially similar to the case in Sheridan v. St. Luke's

Regional Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). In Sheridan, the Court held that
expert medical testimony was not necessary where there was a clear chain of events linking the
nurses' negligence to the child's untreated jaundice and his development of cerebral palsy. See
id. at 785-786, 25 P.3d at 98-99. In Sheridan, the chain of events included the fact that the
jaundice was present within 24 hours of the child's birth, that the nurses failed to notify the
doctor or chart the progress of the jaundice, and sent the family home without any information
regarding the fact that the child's jaundice was abnormal. Based on these facts, the Court
concluded that the jury could reasonably infer that the nurses' failure to properly treat the
jaundice resulted in the child's later diagnosis of hyperbiliritubinaemia which, in turn, led to
cerebral palsy. Although it is unclear from the Court's opinion, it appears that expert testimony
was presented to the jury regarding the causation link between the hyperbiliritubinaemia and the
resulting cerebral palsy. See id

-
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Here, Mr. Harrison has alleged by expert testimony that Dr. Binnion breached the
local standard of care by failing to slow the rate of sodium replacement when she first received
the report that Mr. Harrison's serum sodium was at 96 mEq/L; that Dr. Binnion breached the
local standard of care by failing to properly chart her concerns about a rapid elevation of the
sodium in a manner which would have alerted the nursing staff that Dr. Hartford needed to be
immediately notified of the next sodium value to allow him to make any necessary adjustments
in the sodium replacement rate; and that Dr. Binnion breached the local of standard of care by
failing to ensure that Mr. Iiarrison was admitted to the ICU where he could have more frequent
blood draws to more closely monitor the sodium levels. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25,
Exhibit A, p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19; 88, LL 2-16. Like the nurses' actions in Sheridan, Dr.
Binnion's actions are not of the type that requires medical expertise to establish causation.
Rather, they present a clear chain of events from which the jury could reasonably determine that,
but for her breaches of the local standard of care, Mr. Harrison's serum sodium levels would
have been more closely monitored and would not have risen at a rate in excess of the local
standard of care. Therefore, the jury can determine that Dr. Binnion's actions were a substantial
factor in causing the rapid elevation in Mr. Harrison's serum sodium levels and, in turn, the
cause of his CPM.
2.

Dr. Binnion's actions were a substantial factor in causinn Mr.
Harrison S injuries.

The District Court concluded that Mr. Harrison had failed to establish causation
because there was no expert testimony that, had the sodium replacement been slowed at 6:00
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a.m., Mr. Harrison still would have suffered from CPM. Dr. Binnion asserts that because there is
no expert testimony establishing that the CPM was inevitable based upon her actions, there can
he no causation and she is entitled to summary judgment. Mr. Harrison does not dispute that his
experts could not state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the rise in serum
sodium levels from 96 mEqlL to 105 mEq/L between 12:27am and 6:OOam was, in and of itself,
a significant enough rise to cause the CPM.
Dr. Binnion asserts that Harrison misrepresented Dr. Laureno's testimony in his
opening brief. However, a review of Dr. Laureno's testimony indicates he testified that he could
not state with any certainty that the change in the sodium level between 12:27am and 6:OOam
would have, in and of itself, been sufficient to cause the CPM. This is exactly what Mr. Harrison
has represented Dr. Laureno's testimony to be. Dr. Binnion appears to argue that because Mr.
Harrison referenced slowing or stopping the sodium replacement at 6:OOam when that was not
specifically part of the question to Dr. Laureno, that Mr. Harrison has made a misrepresentation
to the Court. However, Dr. Laureno specifically testified that he could not say with certainty that
"this change" (the one between 12:27am and 6:OOam) without any "subsequent change" would
have resulted in CPM. The reference to subsequent change is clearly a reference to a subsequent
change in the serum sodium levels. Therefore, Dr. Laureno is testifying that the 9 mEqL rise in
the serum sodium level may not have caused CPM had there been no further change in that level
(i.e. had the sodium replacement rate considerably slowed or stopped). It is unclear how this
dispute about Dr. Laureno's testimony is relevant to this appeal as Mr. Harrison has not disputed
Dr. Laweno's conclusion that his CPM was not solely attributable to the rise in sodium that
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occurred between 12:27am and 6:00am, but there was no misrepresentation to the Court on this
issue.
The real issue for this Court is whether the District Court erred in determining that
Dr. Binnion was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of causation because no expert could
testify with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the rise in the sodium &om 12:27am to
6:OOam was suff~cient,by itself, to cause Mr. Harrison's CPM.
Dr. Binnion asserts that because Dr. Laureno testified that Mr. Harrison's CPM
was caused solely by the rapid rise in sodium, the "but for" test must be applied to this case.
However this position, again, ignores the very holding by the Idaho Supreme Court in Newberry
V.

Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005). In Newberry, there was but one cause of the

loss of the plaintiffs eye - a bacterial infection that began at the time of the initial injury. In this
case, there is but one cause of Mr. Harrison's CPM - the rapid elevation in his sodium levels.
However, in Newberry, the Court rejected the "but for" causation test stating that where more
than one cause is asserted, the substantial factor test is appropriate. See id. at 288, 127 P.3d at
191. In so holding, the Court rejected the doctor's argument that the "but for" test was
appropriate because there was only one cause of the injury to the plaintiff, namely the bacterial
infection. The Court held that the doctor's argument ignored the fact that there was evidence
presented that the doctor's negligence contributed to the injury. See id at 289, 127 P.3d at 192.
The Court also stated that the doctor was free to argue to the jury that he was not negligent or
that his negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs damages, but because
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there was evidence that the negligence was a possible contributing cause, the substantial factor
test was appropriate. See id.
Dr. Binnion asserts that the breaches of the local standard of care identified by Dr.
Navar are not factors in causation at all because they all point to the single cause of the CPM, the
rapid rise in sodium s e w . Dr. Binnion's position is untenable in light of the Newberry
decision. Mr. Harrison has provided several different factors which contributed to the rapid rise
in sodium which, including Dr. Binnion's negligence, Dr. Hartford's negligence, and negligence
by the hospital. In turn, the rapid elevation in Mr. Harrison's sodium levels which was caused by
the combination of each of these factors, was the sole cause of his CPM. Mr. Harrison's experts
have testified that Dr. Binnion's breaches of the local standard of care were factors which
substantially contributed to the rapid rise in sodium levels which, in turn, caused Mr. Harrison's
CPM. Like the doctor in Newberry, Dr. Binnion is free to argue to the jury that she was not
negligent or that her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the injuries to Mr.
Harrison. But, where, as here, evidence has been presented that Dr. Binnion's actions were a
contributing cause to the harm suffered by Mr. Harrison, summary judgment is not appropriate
just because Dr. Binnion's action may not have been the sole cause of Mr. Harrison's damages.

In fact, the Court rejected this exact argument in Newberry. In that case, the
defendant argued that the jury instruction on the "substantial factor" test precluded the doctor
from arguing that even if the doctor had done everything properly, the infection would have still
resulted in the plaintiff losing the eye. The Court expressly stated that nothing prevented the
doctor from asserting that ihe plaintiff would have lost his eye regardless of the doctor's actions.
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See id at 289, 127 P.3d at 192. Similarly, nothing prevents Dr. Binnion from presenting her
factual assertion that regardless of what she did or did not do, the CPM would have occurred
anyway. Therefore, because Mr. Harrison has provided multiple causative factors for the rapid
rise in his sodium and, consequentially, his CPM, the substantial factor test is the appropriate test
in this case.
Finally, Dr. Binnion asserts that even if the substantial factor test should be
applied, summary judgment is appropriate in this case because Mr. Harrison's experts did not
establish that Dr. Binnion was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injury. In support of
this position, Dr. Binnion relies upon Dr. Navar's testimony that he did not know if Dr.
Binnion's actions were enough to cause CPM in Mr. Harrison. However, a review of the
testimony cited by Dr. Binnion in support of this assertion reveals that it is the same testimony
relied upon earlier - namely that Dr. Navar could not state with certainty that Mr. Harrison's
CPM would have occurred if the sodium replacement rate had changed substantially or stopped
at 6:OOam. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Ex. A, p. 106, LL 3-20. Once again, however, the
reliance on this testimony ignores the fact that Mr. Harrison has asserted that a substantial factor
in the failure to slow or stop the sodium at 6:OOam was that Dr. Binnion failed lo communicate
within her physician's orders, at the time they were written, her concerns about the rapid
elevation of sodium and that all laboratory values be immediately communicated to the attendmg
physician upon receipt by attending nursing staff. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 20, Exhibit A,
p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19.

-
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Dr. Binnion's argument further ignores that Dr. Navar also testified that Dr.
Binnion breached the local standard of care by failing to ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted
to the ICU unit. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19. Dr.
Navar testified that Mr. Harrison should have been in the ICU unit where he could have more
frequent blood draws to more closely monitor his sodium levels to ensure that the levels were not
rising at a rate more than .5 milliequivalents per hour. See id. at p. 88, LL 2-16. Additionally,
Dr. James Souza, a physician who is board certified in pulmonary and critical care and who
worked in the SARMC intensive care unit as an intensivist in November of 2003, testified that
the standard of care for raising the sodium level of a severely hyponatrernic patient such as Ray
Harrison in Boise, Idaho, in November of 2003 was no more than .5 milliequivalents per hour,
not to exceed 10 milliequivalents per day. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit C
(Deposition of James Souza, M.D.), p. 19, line 12 - p. 21, line 21. Thus, the testimony above
establishes that Dr. Binnion's breaches of the local standard of care were substantial factors in
causing Mr. Harrison's injuries because, had those breaches not occurred, more likely than not,
Mr. Harrison would have been closely monitored and the rate of correction would not have
exceeded .5 milliequivalents per hour.

3.

Dr. Nmar 's opinions are not speculative.

Finally, Dr. Binnion asserts that Dr. Navar's opinions regard'mg Dr. Binnion's
failure to properly communicate her concerns about rapid sodium elevation in her physician's
orders and her failure to ensure Mr. Hartford was admitted to the ICU are speculative because
they depend on the underlying theory that had those communications been made and/or Mr.

-
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Harrison been admitted to the ICU, the rate of replacement would have been slowed and CPM
would not have developed. However, this argument ignores the fact that it is impossible to know
with absolute certainty what would have happened had a different decision been made or a
different action taken.

So, no expert can testify with absolute certainty that the proper

subsequent steps would have been taken if the correct action had been taken by the defendant
doctor. For example, if a plaintiff asserts that a doctor's failure to diagnose a tumor as cancer
has caused substantial damage, no expert can testify with absolute certainty that had the tumor
been diagnosed properly, all caretakers coming in after that point would have performed their
jobs according to the applicable standards of care. Nonetheless, experts must rely on the
assumption that such care would have been given in forming opinions about causation.
This case is no different. There is no reason to believe that had Dr. Binnion
properly communicated the concerns about the rapid elevation in sodium to the nursing staff and
instructed that Dr. Hartford be immediately notified of the sodium value at 6:00am, the nurses
would not have checked the sodium values, recognized the rapid rise, and contacted Dr. Hartford
with that information. Thus, Dr. Hartford would have had that information and Dr. Binnion's
concerns at a time when the rate of elevation could have been slowed or stopped. Further, there
is no reason to believe that had Dr. Binnion insisted upon Mr. Harrison's admission to the ICU,
that the staff in the ICU would not have complied with the local standard of care as identified by
Dr. Souza and closely monitored Mr. Harrison to ensure that the sodium rate did not exceed that
standard of care. As such, Dr. Navar's opinions are not speculative in a manner which renders
them inadmissible.

-
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Additionally, Dr. Binnion's assertions that she did communicate her concerns in
the chart and discussed them with Dr. Hartford are factual issues which are inappropriate for
summary judgment. Mr. Harrison has presented evidence that Dr. Binnion's concerns were not
listed in her physician's orders that were available to the floor nurses after Mr. Harrison's
admission to the hospital. The fact that her concerns were charted in the ER record has no
bearing because she did not carry that concern through in the physician's orders. Further, Dr.
Binnion's assertion that she spoke with Dr. Hartford before Mr. Harrison's admission is
irrelevant to this appeal because Dr. Navar testified that, in his opinion, Dr. Binnion did not
properly communicate the severity of Mr. Harrison's hyponatremia and failed to convey the
severity of his overall condition. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 88, line 25 - p.

89, line 10. Thus, at best, there is an issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Binnion's conduct was
in conformance with the local standard of care.
Further, although Dr. Navar acknowledges that Dr. Binnion did not have
admitting privileges and could not admit Mr. Harrison to the ICU, he expressly testified that it
was his experience that when there is a conflict between the ER physician and the admitting
physician regarding which floor the patient should be admitted to, the ER physician who is
present and has evaluated the patient is the one who should make the final determination. See R.
Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 93, line 24 - p. 94, line 10. Dr. Navar further testified
that if Dr. Hartford had refused to admit Mr. Harrison to the ICU, Dr. Binnion should have asked
Dr. Hartford to come to the hospital and see Mr. Harrison in the ER. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327,
Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 99, LL 1-7. Thus, contrary to Dr. Binnion's assertions, Mr. Harrison
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has presented expert testimony that she did bear responsibility for seeing Mr. Harrison placed in
the ICU and failed in that responsibility.
Therefore, based on the arguments presented above, Mr. Harrison respectfully
requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to Dr.
Binnion on the issue of causation and find that Mr. Harrison has submitted suffcient evidence to
establish a material issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Binnion's breaches of the local standard
of care were a substantial factor in causing the rapid elevation in sodium which, in turn, caused

Mr. Harrison's CPM and remand this case for trial.
D.

Dr. Binnion v.i not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Dr. Binnion has also asserted that she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code $ 12-121. The Court has repeatedly held that such fees are to be
awarded only if the Court "is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." See, e.g., Rowley v. Fuhrman, 135 Idaho
105, 110, 982 P.2d 940 (1999). Dr. Binnion asserts that fees are appropriate because Mr.
Harrison has simply asked the Court to second guess the District Court's decision granting
summaryjudgment to Dr. Binnion.

Mr. Harrison strongly asserts that fees are inappropriate in this matter. First, Mr.
Harrison asserts that fees are inappropriate because Dr. Binnion will not be the prevailing party
on this appeal. Secondly, as is set forth above, Mr. Harrison has submitted evidence and
argument in support of his position that the District Court misapplied the law in this matter. Mr.
Hamson has asserted that the District Court's decision is inconsistent with prior case law from

-
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this Court and has made good faith arguments in support of this issue. To adopt Dr. Binnion's
argument would be change the standard of Idaho Code 5 12-121 from a frivolous standard to one
where a party is entitled to fees upon appeal of a summary judgment decision whenever that
party prevails on appeal. Any appeal of a s w a y judgment decision asks the Court to second
guess the district court's legal determinations. It is certainly not the intent of Idaho Code 5 12121, nor consistent with the Court's interpretation of that statute, to award fees when a party
brings a good faith appeal supported by evidentiary and legal arguments demonstrated why the
District Court erred. See, e.g., Tolley v. Thi Company, 140 Idaho 253, 262-263, 92 P.3d 503,
512-513 (2004) (upholding the district court's decision not to award fees under Idaho Code 5 12121 and declining to award fees on appeal under that statute where the party's legal argument
may have been incorrect but was not plainly fallacious). As such, Dr. Binnion's request for fees
should be denied.
111. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the District Court's decision denying the Motion for Leave to Amend regarding the claim
of negligent credentialing against SARMC; reverse the District Court's decision granting the
Protective Order as to the Board of Medicine exhibits; and reverse the District Court's grant of
sununaryjudgment to Dr. Binnion on the issue of causation.
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